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Abstract
We consider how to organize the processing and marketing of an agricul-
tural product when farming costs are known only by the individual farmers.
We show that when marginal costs are un-correlated, the market for …nal
goods is competitive, and the market for processing is non-competitive, the
socially optimal production levels are sustained by a cooperative and a co-
operative only. We showalso that the cooperative form is particularly useful
when the cost uncertainty is large and the net average revenue product is
small.
Keywords: Economics of Cooperatives, Asymmetric Information, In-
centives, Rationing
1 Introduction
Cooperatives play an important role in several industries. In Denmark, for
example 97% of all the milk, 91% of all the pigs, 60% of all eggs and 30% of
all fruit and vegetables produced in 2001 were processed by cooperatives, cf.
Danske Andelsskaber(2002). In a processing (or marketing) cooperative, the
members are the primary producers and they are also the residual claimants.
In contrast to the actual success of cooperatives in some industries, the
theoretical literature have identi…ed a series of cooperative shortcomings.
”Classical” problems of traditional cooperatives include a quantity control
problem arising from the decentralized rights to choose output levels. Other
problems include the free-rider problem arising from the ability of new mem-
bers to bene…ts from investments by old members and the associated horizon
problem arising from the lack of interest in long term investments with ben-
e…ts exceeding the membership period. The root of these problems lies in
the (incomplete) allocation of property rights. A member of a cooperative
does not receive all the bene…ts nor does he face all the costs of his activi-
ties. Part of the motivation for the so-called New Generation Cooperatives
(NGCs) is to remedy these disadvantages by introducing closed memberships
and tradeable production rights, cf. Harris, Stefanson and Fulton(1996).
2The dominant role of cooperatives in some industries and the coexis-
tence of cooperatives and investor-owned companies in others suggest that
cooperatives must have comparative advantages in some dimensions that can
dominate or at least outweigh their disadvantages in others. One of the pos-
sible advantages of cooperatives that have been suggested in the literature is
the ability to avoid wrong productions and investment levels due to hold-up
issues. Staatz(1984) among others has argued that the risk of post-harvest
’hold-ups’ is a primary reason for cooperatives active presence in the mar-
keting of short-lived products like fruits, vegetables and milk. On the other
hand, it is well known also that ordinary hold-up problems can be handled
e¤ectively by using long term contracts, cf. e.g. Tirole(1988). By negoti-
ating the transaction terms before production (or investment) decisions are
made andby committing not to renegotiate, i.e. by usingex-ante rather than
ex-post negotiations, the production costs will be honored and the produc-
ers will not be forced to under-produce, cf. also Bogetoft and Olesen(2003).
Hence, the traditional hold-up problem is solved by a cooperative - but not
only by a cooperative. The hold-up problem does not su¢ce to rationalize
the existence of cooperatives.
In this paper, we therefore look at another although related incentive
problem, namely the adverse selection problem arising from asymmetric in-
formation about the producers’ costs. In agriculture, for example, there
are good reasons to suggest that the individual farmers have superior infor-
mation about their cost structure. Our aim is to show that the resulting
incentive problems in some settings can be handled e¤ectively using a coop-
erative - and a cooperative only. We hereby suggest an economic rationale
for cooperatives by providing a framework where the traditional cooperative
payment schemes coincide with the unique optimal allocation of the gains.
The idea is simple. Consider an investor owned monopsonist processor.
If farmers have private information about their production costs, ex-ante,
negotiations may not be e¢cient. The more e¢cient farmers will try to
extract information rents by imitating the less e¢cient ones. The rational
response of a processor is to reduce transactions below the …rst best level.
This leads to an ex post ine¢cient situation. As we shall show, the only
way to eliminate the associated economic loss in some cases is to have the
producers integrate forward, i.e. take over the processing, and to do so on
a cooperative basis where the processing surplus is shared among farmers in
proportion to patronage.
To illustrate, let us assume that farmer i can produce 1 unit of a homoge-
3nous output at costs ci: Also, let the sales price net of processing costs be p:
Now, to avoid ex post ine¢ciencies, all types of farmer i with ci · p must
produce. Also, the highest costs type with ci = p must be paid p to earn non-
negative pro…ts. Now, all other types of this farmer can claim to be equally
costly and charge p as well leaving the processor with a zero pro…t. The
same goes for the other farmers. This is in e¤ect the cooperative outcome
since everyone is paid the same price p per unit and all pro…t goes to the
members. An investor owned processor to the contrary would rather ration
away some farmers a priori, say all farmers with ci in ^ ci · c · p and hereby
earn at least p¡ ^ ci on the remaining types of farmer i. In this paper we shall
formalize a generalized version of this argument.
Of course the advantage of the cooperative allocation of surplus - and
in particular the necessity of using the cooperative sharing rule - is only
valid under some more restrictive conditions. We shall formalize these below
when we set up the model - and we shall discuss how robust our results are
to relaxations of the basic assumptions as we go along. To get a …rst idea
of the base case favoring the cooperative form, however, it is useful to think
of settings with a monopsonist processor facing a …xed price for the …nal
goods. In such cases, the cooperative outcome is like a market outcome with
competition for intermediation such that the processors earn zero pro…ts.
The cooperative outcome ensures the socially optimal production levels even
if there is only one processor. The policy implication is: If a processor
exercise market power towards its suppliers they may be better o¤ forming
a cooperative. Market power in processing could – for example - be due to a
natural or regulated monopsony.
We suggest that several sectors have su¢ciently many similarities with
this base case andthat our conclusions maythereforeprovidepartial explana-
tions of some important real world situations. The model could for example
give a stylized picture of the milk-cheese sector. Transportation di¢culties
of fresh milk may give a diary a local monopsony position while easy storage
and transportation of the …nal products, the cheeses, may prevent that in-
dividual dairies have market power. A similar situation with transportation
limitations on the processor’s inputs but not on its outputs may be relevant
in meat production, where the transportation costs may be relatively high
on the input side and possible restricted by animal welfare rules. The …xed
price and natural monopsony situation may also be relevant in relation to the
provision of environmental goods by farmer and forest owners, say a larger
habitant for special species where the value on the output side is regulated
4and the coordination of multiple land owners makes a monopsony arrange-
ment on the input side natural. Another example could be the transmission
of electrical power. Regulation may prevent multiple transmission compa-
nies, and to avoid the social loss from the exercise of market power against
the producers, it may therefore be advantageous to have the government op-
erate the transmission net - or for the producers to operate the network on a
cooperative basis. Di¤erent countries have chosen these di¤erent solutions.
(Observe also that the demand for electricity - at least in the short run - is
quite inelastic to price changes. This makes the assumption of a …xed price
of the processed goods quite natural.)
The idea of the cooperative solution can also be related to the idea of
the Coase theorem in a environment with one-sided asymmetric informa-
tion, cf. e.g. Milgrom and Roberts(1992) and Tirole(1989). The bargaining
ine¢ciency in such cases is resolved when the better informed gets all the
bargaining power. In the cooperative solution, the bargaining power is pre-
cisely given to the more well-informed, namely the farmers. Despite of the
similarity in conclusions, we emphasize that the paper o¤ers non-trivial ex-
tensions of this basic logic. While the classical result deals with a single
seller single buyer situation, the present deals with a situation with multiple
sellers and a single buyer. Also, the multiple sellers have private information
about their own marginal costs but not about that of the other sellers. The
simple result is therefore not directly applicable. In our case, the bargaining
power allocatedto the groupof multiple sellers must be divided among these.
We show that the delegation of power to the well-informed is still attractive.
Also, we show that division of bargaining power among the sellers must –
in some cases – take place according to the cooperative principles of sharing
the income proportional to the delivered quantities. Hence, we deal with
multiple sellers with superior but di¤erent information and with the division
of bargaining power among these.
In this paper, we also investigate under what conditions the incentive
advantages of cooperatives are particularly signi…cant. Using more speci…c
distributional assumptions, we point to two factors, namely the uncertainty
about producer costs ci and the size of the earnings potential (pro…t margin),
p¡ ci; in the industry. We show that high cost uncertainty and low earnings
potential favor cooperatives.
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated considerable variation in
the underlying costs of individual farmers. For recent studies in Ameri-
can, European and Asian contexts, see for example Morrison Paul, Nehring,
5Banker and Sumwaru(2004), Lansink and Pietola(2002) and Coelli (1995).
Even after the costs have been adjusted for production conditions, weather
and similar veri…able di¤erences, there is often a considerable cost spread
left. This spread is routinely interpreted as variations in farm management
practice or managerial skills, an empirical counterpart of the cost types in
game models.
The earnings potential is probably alsoquitelimited in those parts of agri-
culture where competition is particularly …erce, say in the bulk production
of homogenous goods that can be sold on the world market, e.g. grain and
pork carcases, or in the production of fruits and vegetables, where there scale
of the individual productions are more limited and one may therefore have
strong competition even at local markets. These, then, are settings where
we would expect cooperatives to have particular comparative advantages.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We …rst present the set-up and
a useful reformulation of the incentive compatibility constraints. In Sec-
tion 3, we characterize the socially optimal production structure and the
pro…t sharing principles that may support it. The similarities with cooper-
ative processing is explored in Section 4, and the e¤ects of investor owned
processing is investigated in Section 5. Some examples are given in Section
6, extensions are discussed in Section 7, and conclusions are given in Section
8.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a model of a production-processing system with
asymmetric information about production costs and di¤erent possible own-
ership structures in processing. For ease of reference and because agriculture
is an obvious example, we refer to the up-stream …rms, the producers, as
farmers, and to the down-stream …rm as the processor.
We consider n farmers producing the same (homogenous) product. For
farmer i 2 I = f1;:::;ng; we let qi be his production level, Ci(qi) := ci ¢ qi
his production costs and qU
i his capacity. Hence, we assume that each farmer
has a constant marginal costs and a …xed capacity level. This eases the
calculations below. Moreover, we get qualitatively the same results with
more complicated cost structures as we shall discuss in the extensions. The
farmers maximize expected pro…t - and their reservation utilities are 0 for
simplicity.
6We assume that information about production costs are asymmetric. The
marginal cost ci at farmer i is known by himself only. The other farmers as
well as the processor only hold beliefs about his cost. Speci…cally, we assume
that the costs are independent and that ci ’s density fi(ci) = dFi(ci)=dci;
where Fi(:) is the cumulative probability distribution for ci, has support
Ci = [cL
i ;cU
i ]. Production capacities will be considered public information.
This favors an investor owned processor below. In the cooperative setting,
the solution does not depend on information about capacities.
The assumedindependence ofthe marginal costs ofindividual farmers are
of course stylized. It …ts a situation where the marginal costs are determined
by the abilities of the farmers rather better than a case where weather has a
strong impact. In the latter case, we would expect considerable correlation
between the costs. We shall return to the assumption below. For now it
su¢ces to emphasize that we get qualitatively the same results in a more
realistic situation where the costs are composed of a common economy wide
(factor price) e¤ect plus independent idiosyncratic costs elements, i.e. when
ci = cCO + cIDi with the individual costs cIDi;i = 1;:::;n independent. The
economy wide cost level cCO is simply normed to 0 in our set-up.
As a matter of notation, we stick to traditional conventions and let c =
(cj)j2I = (c1;:::;cn);c¡i = (cj)j6=i = (c1;::;ci¡1;ci+1;::;cn); C = £j2ICj =
C1 £ ::: £ Cn and C¡i = £j6=iCj = C1 £ ::£ Ci¡1 £ Ci+1 £ ::£ Cn: Also, we let
Eci
c¡i(:) be the conditional expectation operator with respect to c¡i given ci.









































where the last expression follows by the assumed independence of the indi-
vidual costs.
The farm output is processed and the processed product is sold at a mar-
ket. We assume that one unit of farm output leads to one unit of processed
product and that the market price of the processed product net of process-
ing costs is constant and equal to p. In the terminology of the economics
of cooperatives, p is the constant Net Average Revenue Product (NARP).
Relaxations of the market conditions will also be discussed in the extensions
below.
7There are many possibilities to organize processing. Di¤erent ownership
structures are possible, price and quantity negotiations may be organized in
di¤erent ways, production rights may be allocated using di¤erent auction
mechanisms, and pro…ts may be shared using a variety of sharing rules to
name just a few of the design variables available. Fortunately, by the rev-
elation principle, see e.g. Myerson(1979), we know that whatever can be
accomplished by a given structure can be accomplished also in a direct reve-
lation game in whichthe individual farmers have incentives tohonestly reveal
their private costs and where production and compensation levels are allowed
to depend on the cost types reported.
Therefore, let the production and compensation plans for farmer i, i 2 I,
be given by
qi(:) : C ¡! [0;qU
i ]
si(:) : C ¡! <0
The interpretation is that when the farmers report c, farmer i is supposed to
produce qi(c) and he will be paid si(c).
We can now formulate the organizational design problem as one of de-
signing production and payment plans q(:) = (qi(:))i2I and s(:) = (si(:))i2I




c¡i(si(c) ¡ci ¢ qi(c)) ¸ 0 8ci;i
Eci
c¡i(si(c) ¡ci ¢ qi(c)) ¸ Eci
c¡i(si(c0






0 · qi(c) · qU
i 8c;i
The objective function of the design program depends on the setting and will
be speci…ed as we go along. The speci…cation will depend on the owner-
ship structure. A social planner, for example, would like to maximize social
welfare and an investor owned processor would like to maximize processing
pro…ts.
The …rst set of constraints are the individual rationality (IR) constraints.
They ensure that all farmers get at least their reservation utility. The second
set of constraints are the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. They en-
sure that all farmers will reveal their true types. The third set of constraints
are the budget balancing (BB) constraints. They say that the farmers can
not get more than what is earned at the market place.
8In the formulation above, we have assumed that the incentive problem is
related to the cost types only. The planned production levels qi(c), i 2 I,
can be implemented without additional incentive problems e.g. because the
chosen production levels are directly veri…able such that deviations can be
avoided with in…nitely harsh punishment treats. We therefore do not need to
let si(:) depend on the actual production levels. Observe that by assuming
costless implementation of the chosen production plans, we e¤ectively rule
out post harvest side-trading among the farmers. We shall argue in the
extensions that relaxing this assumption would further favor a cooperative.
The incentive compatibility constraints induce considerable structure on
the production and payment plans. To see this, consider an arbitrary pro-
duction and payment scheme for farmer i, qi(c) and si(c), and let ¹ qi(ci) and
¹ si(ci) be the corresponding conditional expected production and payment
when the types of the other farmers have been integrated out, i.e.
¹ qi(ci) := Eci
c¡i (qi(ci;c¡i)) 8ci
¹ si(ci) := Eci
c¡i (si(ci;c¡i)) 8ci
We now have the following useful lemma, proved in the appendix.
Lemma 1 The production and payment schemes q(:) = (qi(:))i2I and
s(:) = (si(:))i2I are incentive compatible if and only if
² c0
i > c00
i ) ¹ qi(c0




² ¹ si(ci) = ki + ci ¢ ¹ qi(ci) +
RcU
i
ci ¹ qi(~ ci)d~ ci 8i;ci
Lemma 1 gives a partial characterization of the production and payment
schemes that areincentive compatible. The characterization is given in terms
of restrictions on an individual producer’s expected production and payment
given his type. By risk neutrality, the schemes can always be altered via
lotteries with zero means without a¤ecting the incentive compatibility nor
individually rationality constraints. We will encounter this ‡exibility at sev-
eral instances below, and we shall refer to it by saying that schemes are
determined ”modula zero mean lotteries”.
According to Lemma 1, the less e¢cient types produce less (on average),
i.e. the higher the marginal costs ci, the less the (expected) output ¹ qi.
Also, the expected payment ¹ si(ci) is - up to an integration constant -
determined entirely from the production scheme. In addition to the direct
9coverage of production costs, ci¢ ¹ qi(ci), we see that a given type must have an
additional payment that increases in the production levels of the less e¢cient
types with costs in [ci;cU
i ].
Observe that Lemma 1 provides information about the structure of the
production and payment plans for an individual farmer as a function of his
type. Lemma 1 does not provide information about the payment relation-
ships across farmers. Lemma 1 is driven solely by the incentive compatibility
conditions. The other conditions from the design problem, individual ratio-
nality and budget balancing, impose additional conditions on the production
and payments plan. In particular, the budget balancing constraint ties to-
gether the payment across farmers. In this sense, the design problem is not
a traditional multiple agents problem that decomposes into n single agent
problems under cost independence.
Lemma 1 makes it easy to analyze alternative organizations as we shall
show below.
3 Central Planner’s Solution
We…rstcharacterizetheset ofproductionandpayment plans thataresocially
optimal. This provides a useful benchmark against which to compare the
outcome of alternative organizations. We shall talk about this as a central
planner’s solution.
In the setting of this paper, this benchmark is particularly attractive.
As we shall demonstrate, a central planner is able to implement the …rst
best production plan. This is possible despite of the asymmetric informa-
tion about costs and is follows easily from the assumed conditions in the
processing and the …nal product market.
Formally, the central planner (CP) is de…ned via his objective. His aim
is to maximize the market value minus the production costs of all farmers,





Ec((p¡ ci) ¢ qi(c)) =
n X
i=1
Eci((p ¡ci)¢ ¹ qi(ci))
The central planner is assumed to have no more information about the costs
of any farmer than does the other farmers or an investor-owned processor.
Therefore the general design problem from Section 2 is still relevant.
10We see that the central planner’s objective - as the individual rationality
and incentive compatibility constraints - depends only on average production
and payments. Except for the budget balancing constraint, therefore, the
central planner’s problem is e¤ectively separable in n single farmer problems.
To maximize the net bene…ts from production and processing, the central
planner would like farmers with costs below p to maximize production and
the others to not produce at all. The central planner would therefore like to





i if ci · p
0 otherwise
8i (1)
Note that for the average production ¹ qCP
i (ci) to be either the minimal or
the maximal, 0 or qU
i ;the speci…c production level qCP
i (c) for all possible cost
values must be either 0 or qU
i ; i.e. qCP
i (c) = ¹ qCP
i (ci) 8i;c. This plan is the
…rstbestplan, i.e. the optimal production planwithperfect cost information.
To show that this ideal solution is actually feasible, we must specify the
payment plan that makes the combined production-payment plan satisfy the
IR, IC and BB constraints. However, this is easy. Using Lemma 1, we know
that to be incentive compatible, the expected payment must satisfy
¹ s
CP













ki + p¢ qU








To be individually rational, we furthermore need ki ¸ 0 8i
Let us consider now the case where p · cU
i 8i. This is the case where
the information asymmetry is non-trivial, i.e. it is not common knowledge a
priori what thesociallyoptimal productionlevels arefor any of theproducers.
We can say also that this represents a not too pro…table market condition
- the net average revenue product p does not make it optimal to have all
farmer types produce.
From (2), we get for an arbitrary i that ¹ sCP
i (ci) = ki + p ¢ qU
i when
production takes place, ci · p, and ¹ sCP
i (ci) = ki otherwise. Using the budget
balancing constraint, the payment canbe pinneddownevenfurther. To ful…ll
BB, we need ki = 0 8i as is evident from the no-production case. Hence,
11when p · cU





i if ci · p
0 otherwise
8i (3)
If p > cU
i for one or more farmers, the above payment plan still works.
However, inthis casethefarmers with amaximal costcU
i belowpwill generate
a surplus if they are paid according to the p¢qU
i plan in (2). This surplus can
be allocated in di¤erent ways. In this case, therefore, there are alternative
arrangements, including some which would result in a non-allocated surplus,
e.g. a strictly positive pro…t to a processor.
The possible solutions in this case are all those with the structure given
in (2) to make them incentive compatible, and constants ki;i 2 I that ensure
individual rationality, ki ¸ 0;i 2 I; and ful…llment of the budget constraint Pn
i=1si(c) ·
Pn
i=1p¢qi(c). Withthe given structure on the payment scheme,
the individually rationality and budget constraints reduce to








We summarize these observations in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 The social planner can implement the …rst best production
levels. Moreover, to do so, the cost dependent expected payments must satisfy
(3) when p · cU
i 8i , and (2) and (4) when p > cU
i for some i 2 I
The solution in Proposition 1 is strikingly simple.
When p · cU
i 8i it e¤ectively sends the market signals directly to the
farmers. One way to implement this market oriented solution is to ignore
the communication procedure of the revelation game and o¤er the farmers
to buy whatever they produce at the price p per unit. This solution also
works when p > cU
i for some i 2 I. As we shall see below, this is also the
cooperative solution. Note that by the risk-neutrality of the farmers, the
optimal payment schemes can only be characterized in expected terms. The
payment plan is de…ned modula zero mean lotteries. The market oriented
solution is not only attractive by being simple. It is also attractive from a
point of view of treating all farmers equally. Moreover, the equal treatment
of all farmers implies that the mechanism is not vulnerable to side trading -
12no group of farmers can pro…t from trading the product among themselves
before it is processed.
When p > cU
i for some i 2 I , i.e. when we know a priori that some
farmers should produce, there is slightly more freedom in the design of the
incentives. We still need a market-oriented solution p ¢ qi for those farmers
where we cannot know with certainty that they should produce, i.e. those
for which p · cU
i : However, for the other agents with p > cU
i , it is possible to
lower the payment to only cover their maximal possible production costs, i.e.
to pay cU
i ¢ qi. This leaves a surplus that can be allocated independently of
production levels. The inequalities (4) puts some constraint on the way the
surplus can be allocated to the farmers and the processor. It is possible to
pay out quantity independent reimbursements as long as they use up at the
most the surplus generated by the farmers that have costs below the price p
with certainty, i.e. the farmers j withp > cU
j . Ifwe chooseki;i 2 I to comply








i2I ki: Note also that the distribution of the
surplus in the case p > cU
i for some i 2 I must in general be independent
of the production levels to avoid interfering with the incentives to produce.
This is ensured here by sharing the surplus via the ki terms rather than via
the marginal payments.1
4 Cooperative Processor
There are some obvious links between the central planner’s solutions in the
last section and the cooperative arrangements that have been used so exten-
sively, in particular within agriculture.
Imagine that processing is undertaken by a cooperative. The cooperative
is owned and operated by the farmers. Assume furthermore that this is a
traditional cooperative in which
1. Equity gets no interest,
2. Surplus is allocated to members in proportion to patronage, and
1Of course since the agents in our model either do not produce or they produce at
their capacity levels - some of the possible ways to share a surplus would look like a
quantity dependent sharing. This would be the case for example if they share the surplus
proportional to the capacities.
133. Members have a right to deliver total production to the cooperative











In this payment plan, we have taken into account the fact that any farmer j
only knows his own costs cj and that his production decision therefore can
only depend on cj. By the farmers being risk neutral and by using the third










¡ ci ¢ qi(ci)]
s.t. 0 · qi(ci) · q
U
i












i if ci · p
0 otherwise 8i
i.e. the cooperative leads to the socially optimal solution from the last sec-
tion. Combining with Proposition 1, we therefore have the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2 A cooperative (5) implements the socially optimal, …rst best
production plans. Moreover, when p · cU
i 8i; these plans can only be imple-
mented if the surplus is shared as in a cooperative, possibly modi…ed by zero
mean lotteries.
Proposition 2 gives an information economic rationale for cooperatives
in not too pro…table market, i.e. when p · cU
i 8i, such that we cannot
be certain that any given producer should produce. Cooperatives not only
su¢ce to give the socially optimal production levels. Cooperative sharing
of the net revenue product is necessary also to ensure optimality (except for
zero mean lotteries). In any other organization, the farmers’ attempts to
extract information rents and the processor´s attempt to reduce these will
lead to a loss of desirable production. We will demonstrate this in details in
case of an investor owned processor in the next section.
14Observe how this rationale di¤ers from the traditional rationale of avoid-
ing under-production or under-investment associated with the hold-up pos-
sibility, cf. the Introduction. While the cooperative solves the hold-up prob-
lem, so does other arrangements like a priori negotiated (long) contracts.
In the present model, the cooperative is not only an optimal organization,
it is the only optimal organization. Long or short contracts aside, any at-
tempt to divert any of the surplus from the farmers - or any attempt to share
the surplus in any other way than proportional to patronage - will lead to
sub-optimal production.
In a more pro…table market, i.e. when p > cU
i , the cooperative still leads
to the social optimum. But there are other possibilities as emphasized by
Proposition 3. There is some room for paying the processor non-zero pro…t
- or for paying a non-zero interest on the cooperative’s equity. There is also
some room for payments that are not proportional to partronage. The room







5 Investor Owned Processor
Let us assume now that the processor is an investor owned, risk neutral pro…t
maximizing monopsonist. This case is interesting to consider for at least two
reasons. First, it represents the classical alternative to the cooperative case.
Second, a comparison will allow us to quantify the comparative advantages
of the cooperative and to study in more details under which circumstances
these advantages are particularly large.
Being a monopsonist, we assume that the processor has all the bargaining
power. Speci…cally, he is able to o¤er contracts on a take it or leave it basis
and to commit to these contracts as information is revealed. In particular,
this implies that the processor can costlessly avoid any hold-up issues.
The investorowned(IO)monopsonist’scontract designproblem can there-





Ec(p¢ qi(c)¡ si(c)) =
n X
i=1
Eci (p¢ ¹ qi(ci)¡ ¹ si(ci))
The objective of the investor owned processor is to maximize his own pro…t
and not the integrated farming and processing pro…ts that the social plan-
15ner is maximizing. The investor owned processor is therefore willing to forgo
some socially attractive production, i.e. to forgo some production from farm-
ers even though they have ci < p. This so-called rationing is done to save
on the information rents that more e¢cient types can extract. The optimal
rationing will depend on the details of the distribution of types.
To get simple results, we invoke a bit of regularity on the cost distrib-
utions. Speci…cally, we will assume that the cost distributions have weakly
increasing hazard rate, i.e. Fi(ci)=fi(ci) is weakly increasing on [cL
i ;cU
i ] for
8i: This is a property shared by many standard distributions, including the
normal, theuniform, the chi-squared, the logistic and the exponential distrib-
ution. The importance of the hazard rate is intuitively obvious. The optimal
rationing must balance the probability of foregoing attractive production by
a marginally rationing away ci (proportional to fi(ci)) with the probability of
reducing the payment of information rents to the better types (proportional
to Fi(ci)):
A simple rationing principle turns out to be optimal. The processor will
e¤ectively set a hurdle cost ^ c (< p), and use this as a basis for production







i for ci · ^ ci





i for ci · ^ ci
0 otherwise 8i (6)
Types with marginal costs below the hurdle costs ^ ci produce at their capacity
level and are compensated as if the true cost were ^ ci. The hurdle costs for
agent i, ^ ci; is determined as the unique solution to




except for the boundary case where (p¡cU
i )fi(cU
i )¡Fi(cU
i ) > 0 in which case
we have ^ ci = cU
i :
We summarize these properties in a proposition, proved in details in the
appendix.
Proposition 3 With increasing hurdle rate, the investor owned processor




0 8i: In other cases, he reduces the productions to comply with (6) and (7).
2As previously, the conclusions can be sharpened a bit further. Since the average
production must be either minimal or maximal, so must all the speci…c production levels,
i.e. we have qIO
i (c) = ¹ qIO
i (ci) 8i;c.
16Above, we have characterized the best possible outcome for the monop-
sonist. One interpretation of the revelation game is that the monopsonist
o¤ers a menu of contracts from which the farmers’ choose. Another is that
he commits to a certain production and payment plan which depend on the
costs reported by the farmers. The outcome could also be implemented by a
mechanism in which the processor simply o¤ers farmer i a price equal to ^ ci
per unit.
The optimal solution is generally ex post ine¢cient. When ^ ci is an
inner solution, we have ^ ci = p ¡ Fi(^ ci)=fi(^ ci) < p: This means that socially
attractive production is forgone, namely when
ci 2 (^ ci;p)
The monopsonist avoids trading with the higher costs farmers, not because
they are too costly per se but to save on the information rents paid to low
cost farmers. This loss of welfare is the result of the asymmetric information.
Such losses are common in models involving negotiations under asymmet-
ric information, cf. e.g. Akerlof(1970), Vickrey(1961) and Chatterjee and
Samuelson(1983). A model with much the same structure of the optimal
solution as above is Antle and Eppen(1985).
Another interesting feature of the solutionwith aninvestor owned proces-
sor is that the farmers are subject to di¤erent contracts depending on the a
priori information that the processor have about them. They will in general
face di¤erent prices o¤ers if their cost distributions di¤er. The processor is
in general willing to pay more to a farmer the more he knows about his costs.
Thus for example, if his costs distribution undergoes a mean preserving de-
crease in spread the price o¤er will increase, cf. e.g. Antle, Bogetoft and
Stark(1999, 2001) for theoretical results and numerical illustrations. The in-
tuition is simple - the smaller the variance the larger the cost of rationing in
terms of forgone trade 3.
The di¤erences in contract conditions has two implications.
One is that the social cost of having an investor-owned processor is not
only that attractive production is foregone. Also, for a given level of aggre-
gate production
P
i2I qi the allocation of production among the farmers may
be ine¢cient since marginal costs (of the marginal type) may not be equal.
3The optimal hurdle is given by the (p¡^ ci) =
Fi(^ ci)
fi(^ ci) condition above. This means that
farmers with a higher hazard rates will tend to have a lower cost hurdles. In loose terms,
this occurs when the average costs are smaller or when the cost spreads are larger.
17The other implication is that the solution with an investor-owned proces-
sor may be vulnerable to side-trading. If transfer of production among the
farmers cannot be controlled, this may eventually force the investor owned
processor to use the same price o¤er to all farmers. This solution in this case
will still be socially sub-optimal in most cases.
One empirical implication of the di¤erence between the cooperative and
the investor owned solutions is that the suppliers in the former should have
higher average costs. This is an interesting observation, suggested by one
of the referees, since it opens for empirical veri…cation or falsi…cation. We
are not aware of studies that explicitly have addressed this in an empirical
setting. There are numerous studies of the cost implications of cooperatives
but they tend to focus on the – oftenlower - cost e¢ciency of the cooperative
rather than at the cost levels at its member. On the other hand, the result
is consistent with casual empirisme. Thus for example, farming in a country
like Denmark is expensive due to high land and labor prices and environ-
mental restrictions – and yet the farmers succeed. They often point to the
cooperative organization as a possible explanation. Of course, to test the
model using this empirical implication requires careful control for alternative
explanations. Thus for example, the higher average costs could also be the
result of elastic demand for the …nal product and the overproduction that re-
sults in cooperatives in such situations since the farmers are paid the average
– as opposed to the marginal - (net) revenue (product) by the cooperative.
Therefore empirical investigations should control for the …nal goods market
conditions as well.
6 Some Examples
An advantage of the formulations above is that they not only support the
qualitative conclusion that investor owned processing leads to a welfare loss
in many cases where the cooperative processing and sharing of pro…ts would
solve the central planner’s problem. They also allowus to measure the extent
of the welfare loss and to identify circumstances where this is particularly
important. In this section, we provide some illustrations.
Let us assume that costs are independent and uniformly distributed, ci »
U[„i ¡ "i;„i + "i] where "i 2 [0;„] measures the uncertainty about farmer
i’s costs. The hazard rate for farmer i is therefore Fi(x)=fi(x) = [(x ¡ „i +
"i)=2"i]=2"i = x¡ „i+"i when x 2 [„i¡ "i;„i+"i]; 0 for x < „i¡"i; and 1
18for x > „i + "i:
Also, let the (average) net revenue product be p. We assume that p ¸
„i ¡ "i 8i such that we cannot exclude production from any farmer to begin
with in a social optimum.
The potential social value from having farmer i produce - which is also







Also, it follows from the analysis above that an IO processor will choose
^ ci = minf„i +"i;
p+ „i ¡ "i
2
g
If for example „i = 1;"i = 1 and p = 2, the IO processor o¤ers ^ ci = 1; i.e. he
foregoes trading with half of the farmer types, the high costs types ci 2 (1;2],
to reduce his payment to the low cost types ci 2 [0;1] .
A IO processor will therefore lead to a social loss - unless „i + "i ·
(p+ „i ¡ "i)=2; i.e. only when
p¡ „i ¸ 3"i
does the IO processor lead to the socially optimal production. Hence, the
expected pro…t margin p ¡ „i must exceed 3 times the uncertainty measure
"i to avoid a social loss.4
A measure of the Relative Social Loss RSL from having an IO as opposed





2 g(p ¡ ci) 1
2"idci
Rminf„i+"ipg
„i¡"i (p¡ ci) 1
2"idci
where the nominator is the social loss (from not producing when costs are
high) in the IO regime and the denominator is the total social gain available
- and realized by a cooperative. The relative social loss RSL as a function of
p is depicted in Figure 1 below when „i = "i = 1:
4Of course, in the case p · „i ¡ "i which we have excluded, there will also not be a
loss since in this case production is not even attractive under the cooperative regime.
19Figure 1: Relative Social Loss (RSL) from IO processor, „i = "i = 1:
A more detailed illustration of the Relative Social Loss, RSL, is provided
in Figure 2 where we assume „i = 1. We see that except for the triangle
with p¡ „i ¸ 3"i (i.e. when the ”Pro…t Margin” ¸ 3¢ ”Uncertainty”), there
is a loss associated with the IO processor. Moreover, the loss increases in the
uncertainty parameter "i (since this induces the processor to ration more)
and decreases in the pro…t margin p ¡ „i (since this induces him to ration
less).
The production rationed away by the IO processor is the most expensive
and therefore the socially least valuable. This explains why we, in the case
„i = 1;"i = 1 and p = 2, loose 50% of the productive cases but only (RSL=)
25% of the value.
It should be observed, however, that across farmers, we may not just
ration away the least attractive cases. If for example p = 1:5 and we have
two farmers, one with costs uniform on [0;1] and the other with costs …xed
at 1, we would choose ^ c1 = 0:75 and ^ c2 = 1. Thus, all the cost levels we
forego with farmer 1 is actually more pro…table than the one we accept from
farmer 2. This illustrates that the ine¢ciency from private ownership may
not just appear as lost production. It may also show itself as a misallocation
of production rights where the least productive are allowed to produce more
simply because their incentives are easier to control.
20Figure 2: Relative Social Loss from (RSL) from IO processor, „i = 1:
7 Extensions
The derived optimality of the cooperative organizational form rests on two
important assumptions, namely that 1) the cost types ci;i 2 I are indepen-
dent and 2) the net average revenue product p is constant
In addition, we have relied on a more technical assumption, namely that
3) production costs are linear with given capacity constraints. We will now
brie‡y discuss these assumptions and the e¤ects of loosening them.
Dependent Types The assumption that types are independent is neces-
sary to prove Proposition 1. Speci…cally, (1) presumes independence. If the
types are correlated, a social planner could undermine the informational ad-
vantage of the agents by comparing their messages. By paying most when an
agent’s message is likely given the messages of the other agents, the planner
could reduce the payment to the agents. With perfectly correlated types, it
would su¢ce to pay the true costs in all cases. Hence, with correlated costs,
the cooperative solution is but one possibility to get the …rst best outcome.
Indeed, with perfectly correlated costs, an IO processor would also generate
the …rst best outcome.
21One way to relax the independence assumption without changing our
main results is to work with a re…ned set of IR constraints
si(c) ¡ ci ¢ qi(c) ¸ 0 8c;i
i.e. by assuming that the farmers must never end up with a negative cash-
‡ow. The stronger IR constraints can be interpreted as limited liability
constraints, safety …rst constraints, or as the usual participation constraints
coupled with extreme risk aversion (prohibiting negative cash ‡ows). Using
the stronger IR constraints, and assuming that the joint distribution of types
has support C = £i2ICi, we get basically the same propositions as above for
the central planner and the cooperative - but we get it without using Lemma
1.
This is not di¢cult to prove: Assume that p < cU
i . To be socially optimal,
we need farmer i to produce as long as ci · p. The ci = p type of farmer
i must therefore be paid at least p per unit and since all the more e¢cient
types can imitate this type, they must all be paid at least p per unit. The
budget balancing constraint now gives that they must be paid exactly p. Of
course, there may still beroom for some zero meanlotteries. An IO processor
will still ration production since otherwise he will earn zero pro…t. Hence, in
this case the socially optimal outcome is accomplished by a cooperative and
- modula some zero mean lotteries - by a cooperative only.
Another way to relax the independence assumption without altering the
qualitative conclusions is to assume that the marginal costs at farm i, ci, is
the sum of a common economy wide (factor price) e¤ect plus independent
idiosyncratic costs elements, i.e.
ci = cCO +cIDi 8c;i
with the individual costs cIDi;i = 1;:::;n independent. If the the common
term cCO is stochastic but observable to the processor, we get similar results
except that the common costs should be covered initially, i.e. the average
net revenue product p should …rst be reduced to p¡ cCO. Thereafter all the
results above are valid.
Market Power and Scale Economies in Processing The assumedcon-
stancy of the average net revenue product p is an assumptionthat the proces-
sor has no market power and that there are no scale economies in the process-
ing (or less realistically, that these e¤ects even out). Our conclusions - and in
22particular our line of reasoning - are sensitive to this assumption. Relaxing it
may destroy the cooperative’s ability to give the …rst best production levels.
Truly, …rst best production levels may not be possible under any arrange-
ment when p depends on the aggregate production, and in some cases the
cooperative sharing may therefore still be optimal, namely when the social
planner’s solution is closer to the coope solution thatn the solution o¤ered
by the IO processor. However, when the price p becomes more sensitive to
production level, the social planner’s solution may actually be approximated
better by an IO than by a CO processor in this case.
The assumption of a constant p is necessary to avoid the overproduction
problem otherwise generated by a cooperative. In a cooperative, a member
takes into account the price reduction that his production in‡icts on himself,
but he does not internalize the loss imposed on the other members. This
makes him overproduce. An IO processor on the other hand internalizes
these losses. It follows that an IO processor may be socially superior as
the internalization of the price reduction e¤ect may more than outweigh
the rationing due to asymmetric information. An added drawback of the
cooperative when p decreases with production and costs are uncertain is the
lack of coordination of production levels. By the processor’s revenue function
being concave, the socially optimal production levels will be coordinated
such that farmer i produces relatively more when farmer j has high costs
and therefore produces less. This coordination is necessary even though
costs types are independent - but it is not accomplished by a traditional
cooperative.
Despite of these drawbacks of a cooperative when p depends on the pro-
duction level, it is worthwhile to mention that the relative merits compared
to an IO organization may depend intimately on the details of the output
market. Albæk and Schultz(1998) for example have demonstrated that the
lack of output control may constitute a strategic advantage in a Cournot
market, much like the employment of a sales maximizing manager may be
attractive, cf. Tirole(1988).
Cost Structures In addition to the above qualitatively essential assump-
tions, we have introduced a more technical assumption about the class of cost
functions. We have assumed that the farmers have linear costs and …xed ca-
pacity levels. One can argue that this is a relatively narrow class of cost
functions. This is deliberate, however. Since we want to demonstrate that
23a cooperative is necessary to ensure the socially optimal production levels, a
small class of function makes the result stronger5.
The other implication, i.e. that the cooperative su¢ces to give optimal
production levels, would favor working with a large class. This way, however,
is simpler and it holds for arbitrary classes of cost functions: Whatever his
cost function ci(qi), farmer i will choose the socially optimal production level,
i.e. the qi maximizing pqi¡c(qi) whenprocessing is organized asa cooperative




j2I qj(cj)] = pqi.
8 Conclusions
We have shown that with asymmetric information about farm level produc-
tion costs, the only way to ensure socially optimal production levels may be
to organize processing as a cooperative. This gives an information economic
rationale for cooperatives. Speci…cally, we have shown that a cooperative is
necessary when farmers’ marginal production costs are independent, the net
average revenue product from sales is constant, and the income distribution
does not matter.
We have shown alsothat the relative advantage ofcooperatives (compared
to investor owned processors) is largest, when the cost uncertainty is large
and when pro…tability is limited, i.e. when the net marginal product is small
compared to the primary production cost. In these cases an investor owned
processor tends to ration away more social value to gain private value. Since
the agricultural sector may have these properties, we suggest that our results
may in part explain the apparent success of cooperatives among farmers.
In reality, the choice of organizational structure or contract and sharing
rules is not only determined by incentive costs. The resulting behavior at
the downstream market for example should be taken into account as well.
When the downstream market gets less competitive, the social advantage of
the cooperative reduces since the quantity control problem of the cooperative
becomes more signi…cant. Still, as discussed above, the relative merits of the
cooperative will depend on the details of the output market, and the higher
production may actually have strategic advantages in some oligopolistic …nal
5We could have simpli…ed the assumptions about linear costs even further by using a
discrete set of possible ci values. A drawback of this, however, is that it requires us to as-
sume that p can take on the same values - a somewhat awkward assumption. Furthermore,
using these assumptions we would not get the simple hazard rate results from Section 5.
24goods markets. We leave the analysis of the interaction between the input
market and such output markets to future research.
25Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Initially, we note that by independence, the conditional expectation oper-
ator Eci
c¡i(:) does not depend on the speci…c value of the costs ci. Therefore,
the incentive compatibility constraints are equivalent to
¹ si(ci) ¡ ci ¢ ¹ qi(ci) ¸ ¹ si(c0
i)¡ ci ¢ ¹ qi(c0
i) 8i;ci;c0
i: (8)
Now to prove the only if part, we must show that the two properties in the
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i)¡ c00
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i ) ¹ qi(c0
i) · ¹ qi(c00
i); as claimed in the lemma. By
¹ qi(¢) monotonously decreasing, it follows also that d¹ qi(c0
i)=dc0
i exists almost
everywhere (a.e.), cf. e.g. La¤ont and Tirole(1993) p. 63.





















































We see therefore that since d¹ qi(c0
i)=dc0
i exists (a.e.), so does d¹ si(c0
i)=dc0
i: Fur-
thermore, going to the limit (c00
i ! c0
i) in (9), we get that
d(¹ si(ci) ¡ ci ¢ ¹ qi(ci))
dci
= ¡¹ qi(ci) · 0 a.e.
This shows that the less e¢cient types earn less pro…t and it implies




¹ qi(~ ci)d~ ci
26which is the last property in the lemma.
To show the if part, we shall now show that the two properties in the
lemma imply incentive compatibility. Inserting the expression for ¹ si(:) into
the incentive compatibility constraint (8) we get




¹ qi(~ ci)d~ ci ¡ ci ¢ ¹ qi(ci) ¸
ki +c0






¹ qi(~ ci)d~ ci ¡ ci ¢ ¹ qi(c0
i) 8i;ci;c0
i:















¹ qi(~ ci)d~ ci 8i;ci;c
0
i
which holds because ¹ qi(:) is weakly decreasing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
We see …rst that the processor’s objective - as the constraints - depends
only on average production and payments. Also, the objective - as the con-
straints - are e¤ectively separable in farmer speci…c problems.
Using Lemma 1, we shall nowcharacterize the solution to contract design
problem. Assumethat (s(:);q(:))is afeasible solution andlet ^ ci bethe largest
cost type for farmer i that will produce, i.e. ^ ci = supfcij¹ qi(ci) > 0g: By the
…rst property in Lemma 1, ¹ qi(ci) > 0 for all ci < ^ ci and ¹ qi(ci) = 0 for all
ci > ^ ci. Also, it follows from the monopsonist interest in reducing payment
that ¹ si(^ ci)¡ ^ ci ¢ ¹ qi(^ ci) = 0:6
Using the second property in Lemma 1, we therefore have
¹ si(ci) = ci ¢ ¹ qi(ci) +
Z ^ ci
ci
¹ qi(~ ci)d~ ci 8ci;i
Substituting this into the objective function and using partial integration,
6By IR ¹ si(^ ci) ¡ ^ ci ¢ ¹ qi(^ ci) ¸ 0. Now if ¹ si(^ ci) ¡ ^ ci ¢ ¹ qi(^ ci) = " > 0, we also have
¹ si(ci) ¡ ci ¢ ¹ qi(ci) ¸ " 8ci < ^ ci since the producer’s expected pro…t is decreasing in the
cost type, cf the proof of Proposition 1. In this case, the contract could be improved by









p ¢ ¹ qi(ci) ¡ ci ¢ ¹ qi(ci) ¡
Z ^ ci
ci









[(p ¡ci)¹ qi(ci)fi(ci) ¡ Fi(ci)¹ qi(ci)]dci
This objective must be maximized subject to the constraints that production




i ) ¹ qi(c0
i) · ¹ qi(c00
i), and
that they do not exceed the capacities, i.e. 8i;ci : 0 · ¹ qi(ci) · qU
i .
This is easy, however, when the hazard rate Fi(ci)=fi(ci) is weakly in-
creasing on [cL
i ;cU
i ] for 8i:
From the integrand of GIO(q;s), we see that the processor would like to
choose the maximal production level ¹ qi(ci) = qU
i when (p¡ci)fi(ci)¡Fi(ci) ¸
0 and the minimal production level ¹ qi(ci) = 0 when (p¡ci)fi(ci)¡Fi(ci) < 0:
Since (p¡ci) isdecreasinginci and Fi(ci)=fi(ci) is weakly increasinginci, this
does not con‡ict with the monotonicity of ¹ qi(:): Hence, letting ^ ci = supfcij















ci ¹ qi(~ ci)d~ ci = ^ ciqU
i for ci · ^ ci
0 otherwise
(11)
where ^ ci is de…ned as the unique solution to
(p ¡ ^ ci) =
Fi(^ ci)
fi(^ ci)
except for the boundary case where (p¡cU
i )fi(cU
i )¡Fi(cU
i ) > 0 in which case
we have ^ ci = cU
i : Q.E.D.
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